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on the peace process in the Balkans
- 
implementation of the Dayton Accords
The Assembly,
(i) Noting with satisfaction that hostilities have ceased in the whole of the territory of former Yugosla-
via and that most of the commitments entered into by the opposing parties in relation to the mtlitary
aspects of the peace accords concluded in Dayton and Paris have been honoured;
(ii) Paying particular tribute, both to NATO's vital contribution to this result and its impeccable organi-
sation of the joint operation caried out by IFOR, and to all countries participating in the operation:
(iii) Concerned nevertheless by the major difficulties encountered in implementing the civilian aspects
of the peace agreements and by the persistence of significant tensions between the entities and ethnic com-
munities of Bosnia and Herzegovina and in other Balkan regions;
(iv ) Anxious also about the persistent difficulties which are hindering the smooth running of the Feder-
ation of Bosnia and Herzegovina:
(v) Recalling that the establishment of a lasting order of peace in the Balkans depends in addition on
settlement of several matters outstanding such as the dispute over the Brcko corridor, the demilitarisation
of eastern Slavonia, the dispute over the Prevlaka peninsula and the problem of giving the provinces of
Kosovo. Vojvodina and Sandjak a status which guarantees them a degree of autonomy;
(t'i) Convinced nevertheless that for the peace process to succeed, it is vital to ensure the Republic of
Bosnia and Herzegovina can be run smoothly on the basis of a rebuilding of the economy. freedom of
movement and a spirit of cooperation between all the various entities and ethnic groups which make up
the country;
(vii) Stressing that the success of the Dayton Accords requires that Europe provide substantial economic
aid to the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, to be shared equitably between the various parts thereof and
specifically directed towards facilitating resettlement of refugees who cannot return to their place of origin;
(r'lii) Noting that the people. and particularly refugees. cannot genuinely be consulted if there is no agree-
ment among the parties establishing the composition of the electorate and voting arrangements;
(i.r) Convinced that the structures of government of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina can func-
tion only if the main areas of responsibility. including national defence, are restored in the Ionger term to
central government and if the country's defence rests upon a single unified armyl
(r) Considering nonetheless that this aim can only be achieved if the internal problems of the Muslim-
Croat Federation are overcome and if the Bosnian Serbs evince a spirit of full cooperation within the coun-
try's structures of government;
(xi) Insisting that all concerned, Serbs, Muslims and Croats, hand over immediately to the lnternational
War Crimes Tribunal in The Hague all persons indicted for war crimes, including Mr Karadzic and Mr
Mladic, that IFOR set aside its reluctance to give the Tribunal practical assistance regarding the extradi-
tion of such persons and that its mandate be extended in order to cover this problem;
(rii) Stressing also that the best way of developing a spirit of cooperation among the Bosnian Serbs is to offer
them concrete proof that they are not being excluded from the various projects for rebuilding the countryl
(xiii) Convinced furthermore that the appointment of Mrs Haller, former permanent representative of the
Swiss Government to the Council of Europe, as ombudsman based in Sarajevo will help to detect past and
future violations of basic human rights;
(xit') Welcoming wholeheartedly in this context the conclusion 
- 
under OSCE auspices and within the
framework of the agreement on regional stabilisation 
- 
of an initial agreement between the two entities of
Bosnia and Herzegovina on confidence- and security-building nleasures in that country. while regarding
this outcome as a first step towards progressive rapprochement of the armed forces of those entitiesl
(.rr') Desirous equally that the negotiations on arms and troop limitations between Croatia. the Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia and the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina. also taking place within the frame-
work of regional stabilisation, produce, within the allotted time span, an equitable agreement acceptable
to all the parties concernedl
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(xvi) Concerned, on the other hand. about the differences that have emerged between Europeans and
Americans with regard to the United States programme for providing the Federation of Bosnia and Her-
zegovina with aid to " equip and train " its armed forces before the IFOR mandate expires;
(xt,ii) Convinced nevertheless, while appreciating the United States' concern not to abandon the Muslims
in Bosnia and Herzegovina in the face of armed aggression, that priority should be given to ensuring the
implementation of confidence-building measures 
- 
which look very promising 
- 
and to the negotiations
on arms and troop limitations throughout the region;
(rviii)Convinced therefore that the time is not yet ripe to consider lifting the embargo on consignments of
arms and military equipment imposed on the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro),
Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina;
(.rir) Taking this opportunity to express its most sincere gratitude to all the countries which have partici-
pated to date in WEU operations on the Danube and in the Adriatic to enforce the embargo, and to the
WEU police force in Mostan
(xr) Taking the view that any consideration of the need to provide help to equip and train Bosnian armed
forces or the usefulness of so doing should also take account of the need to avoid any action that might
encourage centrifugal tendencies in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina and should do everything
possible to facilitate rapprochement of the entities in the country,
REcovuENos rHAT tuE CouNctt-
1. Press the European Union to extend the mandate of the European Administrator of the town of Mos-
tar beyond 23 July 1996, and itself extend the mandate of the WEU police force in Mostar as a conse-
quence;
2. Urge WEU member countries to ensure that the promised number of 200 WEU police officers can
be deployed in Mostar;
3. Actively support OSCE efforts to implement confidence- and security-building measures in Bosnia
and Herzegovina by:
(a) asking the WEU Institute for Security Studies to offer its help to the OSCE Centre for Conflict
Prevention to organise seminars as provided by the agreements on cooperation between the
armed fbrces of the entities of Bosnia and Herzegovinal
(b) offering the OSCE and the Government of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina WEU's
assistance in developing a programme tor cooperation between the armed tbrces of its entities,
with the long-term objective of transferring all defence-related responsibilities to the Govern-
ment of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina.
4. Make representations within NATO. the European Union and to the member countries of the
Contact Group to the effect that the embargo on consignments of arms and military equipment should
remain in fbrce at least until:
(a) it can be confirmed that all the agreements on regional stabilisation provided for in Annex 1-B
to the General Frarnework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina have taken effect
and are being fully implemented;
(b,) eastern Slavonia has been completely demilitarised;
(c) arbitration on the Brcko conidor is accepted;
(ti) the dispute over the Prevlaka peninsula has been settled:
(c) a rnutually agreed autonomous status has been established for the provinces of Kosovo, Vojvo-
dina and Sandjak, and Belgrade has authorised the return of the OSCE mission to Kosovo;
5. Press the United States to agree that the aim of any " equip and train " programme for Bosnian
fbrces must be to promote the development of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina as a whole;
6. Ask the European Union to envisage extended assistance with the reconstruction of Bosnia and
Herzegovina and the resettlement of refugees, ensuring that such assistance is shared equitably between
the various parts of the Republic;
1 . Request that it also instruct its High Representative responsible for coordinating the civilian aspects
of the pea-ce agreement for Bosnia and Herzegovina to negotiate an electoral settlement with all the par-
ties concerned allowing all former inhabitants of that Republic to vote either by post or in person.
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Explnnatory Memorandum
(submitted by Mr Roseta, Rapporteur)
I. Introduction
l. When the Political Committee decided in
London on 22 February 1996 to submit a report
to the June 1996 session on the peace process in
the Balkans and the implementation of the Day-
ton Accords. your Rapporteur agreed to accept
responsibility for the task of preparing it through
a conviction that the Assembly would be neglec-
ting the responsibilities conferred on it by the
modified Brussels Treaty by not seizing the
opportunity at its forthcoming session of making
a contribution to the search for solutions to the
massive problems still to be resolved in order to
restore the rule of law, peace, confidence, stabi-
lity and prosperity to the Balkan regions, which,
since 1991, have been devastated by a cruel and
murderous war, raging at only a few hours'
flying time from the capitals of western Europe.
This is a war that has not only cost over 200 000
lives and unleashed unbridled hatred and vio-
lence between peoples which had previously
lived peaceably together but has also come close
to reviving dangerous differences between the





as they nonetheless prepare
to establish a common foreign and security
policy.
2. Although it has proved possible on thrs
occasion to avoid differences between Europeans
on ways of ending the conflict bringing them to
the brink of confrontation, it has taken United
States intervention to achieve the breakthrough
that has brought an end to hostilities and compel-
led the parties to the conflict to reach agreement
on arrangements for re-establishing peace in for-
mer Yugoslavia.
3. Nevertheless the task of pacifying the Bal-
kans is still nowhere near being accomplished.
One of the bitterest experiences of the war has
been that for nearly five years the international
community has been unable to decide on appro-
priate means to prevent the indescribable suffer-
ing of the various civilian populations and, more
particularly. the waves of " ethnic cleansing ", in
outright violation of the fundamental principles of
human rights.
4. Even after signature of the Dayton and
Paris Accords, the problems to be resolved in
order to establish a lasting peace in the Balkans
are so complicated that it is difficult to ascertain
how an Assembly such as our own can make a
useful contribution to their settlement. Presenting
this report carries several risks, the first being that
the situation on the ground could develop at such
a pace that by the time it is submitted at the plen-
ary session, the text adopted by the Committee
may. to a large extent, have been overtaken by
events. Secondly, there is a risk of the report becom-
ing bogged down in the detail of the highly
complex problems arising on the spot and conse-
quently failing to offer the comprehensive over-
view and general understanding required for over-
all management of the conflict. On the other hand.
matters of detail cannot be overlooked since they
often hold the key to the success or failure of the
entire peace process.
5. This report therefore has a twofold aim. It
should first provide a suitable basis for a quality
debate at the plenary session. Such a debate would
probably be useful in itself. But it should, as far as
possible, lead the Assembly to express a common
will to exert strong pressure on all the political
leaders involved in the peace process in former
Yugoslavia to maintain their efforts to ensure its
outcome is a lasting success. A revaluation of
WEU's role in that context will be essential.
II. The situation in the wake
of the Dayton and Paris Accords
6. At the time of writing, it would appear that
most of the provisions of the Dayton Accords
concerning the military aspects of the peace settle-
ment, as set out in Annex 1-A to the General
Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and
Herzegovina have been implemented. This speci-
fically holds good for the parties' commitment
" within 120 days after the Transfer of Authority "(from the UN to IFOR) to " withdraw all heavy
weapons and forces to cantonment/barracks areas
or other locations as designated by the IFOR
Commander " (Deadline " D + 120 " of the Day-
ton Accords. Article IV.5, Phase III).
7. According to information obtained at a
press conference given by General Joulwan in
Brussels, on 22 April 1996, withdrawal to bar-
racks of the forces of the parties to the conflict and
their demobilisation was 90Vo complete four days
after the " D + 120 " deadline.
8. However the implementation of the Dayton
Accords raises massive difficulties in relation to
mine clearance. especially around the Gorazde
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pocket and in those regions whrch were the scene
of the hear,'iest tighting. The parties comrnitted
themselves to taking the necessary action. within
30 days of the date on which the Dayton Accords
entered into fbrce. to relnove. disrnantle or des-
troy all rnines, unexploded ordnance, explosive
devices etc. and above all to mark their emplace-
ments in accordance with IFOR instructions.
9. This task rs provrng extremely difficult
since the whereabouts of many minefields are not
known. The IFOR Deputy Commander told your
Rapporteur during his visit to Sarajevo that if a
thousand rnine clearance experts were employed
to carry out the work, they would take some 33
years to complete it. According to some reports. it
is also necessary to bear in rnind the attitude of
some of those holding infornration on rnineflelds
who will ttflen agree to release it to IFOR only in
return for tinancial reward.
10. This difficult situation casts doubt both on
the likelihood of economic activity being resurned
and of the rc'fugees returning and civilians being
allowed complete freedom of movement 
- 
all key
elements o1'the peace agreements. It is fiequently
emphasised that free movement of persons,
goods, services and capital and particularly the
right to freedom ofresidence are referred to in the
part of the peace accords on civilian implementa-
tion and in the Constitution of Bosnia and Herze-
govina, the text of which fbrms Annex J to the
accords. The same holds good for the right of
refugees and displaced persons freely to return to
their homes of origin, the details of which are set
out in Annex 7 to the franrework agreement.
According to information released by the United
Nations High Commissioner for Refugces, the
total number of Bosnian refugees stands at around
two million. rn other words practically half of the
pre-war population'.
I 1. However it must not be torgotten that guar-
anteed freedom of rnovement also forms part of
the militon' aspects of the Dayton Accords and
hence falls within IFOR's area of responsibility.
By this is ureant not only complete freedom of
movement along the interim routes between Sara-jevo and the Gorazde area, but also. rnore gener-
ally, IFOR's right 
- 
within the limits of its princi-
pal task and on request 
- 
to observe and prevent
interference with the movement of crvilian popu-
lations, refugees and displaced persons and " to
respond appropriately to deliberate violence to
life and person " (Article Yl 3 ( d ) of Annex 1-A to
the Agreement on the Military Aspects of the
Peace Settlement).
12. Incidents that occurred at the end of April
1996 in several places in Bosnia and Herzego-
vina. involving Muslims who wished to take
advantage of a Muslim holiday to visit cemeteries
in territory that is now Serb-held and were pre-
vented from doing so by Bosnian Serbs, put IFOR
troops in an embamassing situation. IFOR had set
up a road block near Doboj in order to prevent
Muslim-Serb confrontation and when Muslirns
tried to circumvent this in order to enter Serb ter-
ritory. two were killed and several injured by
exploding mines, but according to another report.
the Serbs also fired on the Muslims.
13. IFOR faces a dilemma when such incidents
occur: it considers it necessary to prevent lar-ee
groups of Muslims crossing demarcation lines
without prior warning in order to avoid skir-
mishes. but in doing so, it restricts by its own
action the fieedour of movement of persons guar-
anteed under the Dayton Accords. Your Rappor-
tc'ur had occasion during his visrt to the Gorazde
region to observe just how diff'erently these inci-
dents are viewed by the various groups involved.
While there were those that expre'ssed the convic-
tion that " lnass " movelnents of Muslims into
Serb-occupied sectors were part of a Muslim
policy to provoke the Serbs and denounce them if
they tailed to comply with the Dayton Accords,
the President of Gorazde District. Mr Rascic
Rijad. went so far as to tell your Rapporteur that
IFOR's behaviour was becoming increasingly like
that of its predecessor, UNPROFOR.
l+. Moreover. IFOR stresses that maintenance
of civil order is not part of its duties but the task of
the police forces of the entities, aided by the UN
International Police Task Force created under
Annex I I to the Dayton Accords on the basis of
Security Council Re'solution 1035. However this
force is being set up irt situ only very gradually
and has neither arms nor other enforcement
means. All it has is the option of negotiating equi-
table arrangements with the police authorities of
the entities rn Bosnia and Herzegovina. Your Rap-
porteur has felt impelled to describe the problem
of movement of the civilian population in such
detail because it is an example of the enonnous
dilficulties that are bound to arise in guaranteeing
the return of refugees and avoiding demarcation
lines between the Federation of Bosnia and Her-
zegovina and the country's Serb teritories effec-
tively becoming a frontier.
15. Withdrawal of " fbreign forces " from the
territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina, should
have taken efl'ect within 30 days of the date on
which the Dayton Accords entered into force.
These are in the main Islamic volunteers, essen-
tially consisting of Iranians and others who
lbught alongside the Bosnian Muslimsl it is not
known how many of them are still on Bosnian
soil. Furthermore. according to information
which has appeared in the press'. Bosnian com-
l. Neue Ziln her Zeinn,q. 2 Ma1' 1996 2. Le Monde,27 April 1996
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rnandos have been trained in Iran. The Unrted
States iind sereral of the Arab countries are pre-
pared to provrde substantral frnancial help in
equipping and training the Bosnian-Croat Feder-
ation army. but such assistance is conditional
upon the prior departure of all lslamic foreign
cornbatants ll'onr Bosnian territorr.
16. The problem of equipping and trainin-u
the armt' of the Bosnian-Croat Fcderation. an
idca u'hrch ori-sinated in the United States and
Turkey. is one subject on u'hich there is basic
disagree nrcnt between the United States and
rnost European Union countries; the latter feel
that the neu' stability, in the region should be
based primarih' on vigorous disalmame'nt and
arms control measures. Your Rapporteur will
return to this fundamental problem in a later
chapter of the report.
11. The problenr o\,er the exchange of prison-
ers was to have been settled just betore the start
of the second Donors' Conf'erence tow'ards the
reconstruction of Bosnia and Herzegovina, held
in Brussels. on ll and l3 April 1996, the General
Affairs Council of the European Union having
decided at that point that the contercnce u,ould
not take place unless all prisoners of war were
first released. Hou'ever accolding to information
your Rapporteur obtained from General Hein-
rich. IFOR Deputy, Cornmander. b1, 29 April
prisoner exchange had still not been fully
completed.
18. Honouring thc commitnrr-nts entel'cd into
by all the signatories of the Day,ton Accords to
comply, u,ith any instructions of the International
Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia as rcgards
arrest, detentiou, and handing over those accused
of war crimes to thc Tribunal is still a sensitive
probleur. It is primarily Belgrade that is reluctant
to nreu-t the condrtions requircd for handing over
war criminals to The Hague. despite the verbal
assurances of the Govemlrer)t of the Republic of
Yugoslavia that it will cooperate u,'ith thc Interna-
tional Tribunal'. However another difficulty that
ariscs is that of IFOR cooperation with the Inter-
national War Crimes Tribunal in The Ha-sue. On
9 May 1996 SACEUR and the Tribunal signed a
mernorandur.n of understanding, which has not
heen made public. definin-e the practical arange-
rrents under w'hich IFOR u,ill detain and hand
ovcr to the Intenrational War Criures Tribunal per-
sons indictc-d fbl war crimes and the arran-qements
concerning the support IFOR will provide to the
Tribunal. Hou'ever. it appears that the agreement
reached is confined to confirmation of the deci-
sions taken by the North Atlantrc Council last
December. 
"vhereby IFOR was to detain and handover to the Tribunal persons indicted fol war
crimes only' u,here it came into contact with such
persons in the exccution of its remit. IFOR is there-
fore under no obli-eation to actively seek the
persons in question.
19. The divrsion of Bosnia and Herzegov'ina
into its two political entities (the Muslim-Croat
Federation (5lc/() and the Republica Srpska
(197c)) came into force- on 19 March 1996. in
other words 90 days aftcr the start of the peace
process (" D + 90 "1. The two entities are uow
separated b1, a demilitarised zonc I 000 km long
and -X km wide. The Governrnent of Bosnia and
Herzegovina lecovered flve districts of Sarajevo
but at the cost of severe damage and destruction
caused b1' the Serbs. especially in the Grbavica
and Ilidza districts. since almost all the Serbs
there moved out so as not to haye to live under the
authority of the Federation. IFOR troops \r'ere
unable to prevent the destluction of many houses
and off-ered assistance with the evacuation of the
Serb population organised b1, the Bosniau Serb
army despite the- fact that this exodus intiinged
the prine iple ol eo-existence among eorrrrrrunities
throughout the conntry. which u'as confirmed in
the Dayton Accords and, above all. in the Consti-
tution of Bosnia and Herze-eovina.
20. A fundarnental elcment of the Dayton
Accords is the agreement on regional stabilisa-
tion, the parties to which are the Republic of Bos-
nia and Herzegovina, Croatia, the Federal Repub-
lic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) and
the tlvo eutities of Bosnia and Herzegovina.
namely the Muslim-Croat Federation and the
Republica Srpska (the Bosnian Serbs). This
agreement. which fbrnrs Annex l-B to the Gene-
ral Framervork Agreement for Peace in Bosnia
and Herzc-govina provides tor tu'o essential mea-
SU[CS:
(a) negotiations between the entities of
Bosnia and Herzcgovina, undel the
auspices of the Organisation lbr Secu-
rity and Cooperation in Europe(OSCE). to agree upon e series of
confidence- and security-burldrng mea-
sures in Bosnia and Herzegovina:
(D) negotrations, again under the auspices
of thc OSCE, to limit weapol.ts in order
to achieve balauced and stable defeuce
force levels at the lowest numbers pos-
sible. based on the lou'est level of
al'manlents.
Within thc framework of these provisions, the
parties concerned hale also undertaken to com-
Irence negotiations on an agreement establishing
voluntary limits on rnilitary rnanporver. The
numerical limits on equipment and arrns were as
defined in the relevant sections of the CFE treaty.
The two sets of negotiations opcned in Bonn on
18 Decernber 1995, under the chairmanship of the
German Minister for Foreign Affairs.
-1. .\errt' Zrut'ltt,r Zeiturr,q, l9 FebrLrar-1' 1996.
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21. In tenns of confidence-building, it proved
possible tbr the entities of Bosnia and Herzego-
vina to si-9n an initial agreement in Vienna on 31
January 1996 on confidence-and security-build-
ing measures which had been under negotiation
since -1 Januarl, 1996 under OSCE auspices. The
agreement co\rers sixtecn sepalatc confidence-
burlding measures. in particular. exchange of
military intelligence, restrictions on certain mili-
tary activities. withdrarval of heal'y weapons.
identilication of arms-manufacturing plants, mili-
tarY cooperation programnres, establishrnent o1'
military liaison tasks and commitments reeardin-u
non-proliferation of rveapons of mass destruc-
tion'. Following thc conclusion of this agreement,
the main task will be to ensure that the application
of the various nreasLrres envisaged is monitored
efficiently.
22. AIso in Vienna. negotiations on disarma-
ment in Bosnia and Herzegovina are being
conducted under OSCE auspices and the chair-
manship ol' the Norwe-sian Ambassador. Vigleik
Eide; these should lead by 6 June to the conclu-
sion of an arms reduction agreelnent along the
lines of the Treaty on thc reductiort of couventio-
nal fbrces in Europe (CFE Treatl'). ln the event of
disagreenrent over weapons ceilings. the Dayton
peace plan (articles IV and V of Annex 1-B to the
framework agreement) provides that ar-maments
held by the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia will
be reduced to 15% of their present holdrngs or
" baseline " and the holdings of Bosnia and Her-
ze,eovina and Croatia linrrted lo 30% of the base-
line. The 30% allocated to Bosnia and Herzego-
vina would be divided between the entities on the
basis of a ratio of tr.r'o (2) fbr the Federation of
Bosnia and Herzegovina to one ( I ) for the Repub-
lika Srpska (Article lY.3 (e) of Annex l-B to the
framework agreement).
23. As vour Rapporteur rnentioned earlier. the
question of how weapons held by the respr--ctive
tbrmer belligerents in the Balkans are to be limi-
ted has already become a subject of profirund
disagreernent between the United States and most
European Union nternber states. On 16 March
1996. alluding to effolts to disann Bosnia and
Herzegovina being pursued in Vienna under the
aegis of the OSCE, the US Secretary of State.
Mr Christophcr. took the view that armamcnts
control alone could not create the nccessary stabi-
lity and that it was therefore necessary tor the
Bosnian Governrnent to be provided rvith further
equrpment and lraining'.
21. The United States, with Turkey's assis-
tance. thereforc organised a conference in
Ankara with a view to implementing its project
to arrn the Muslim-Croat Federation in Bosnia
1. Nourt'llc,s Atlouticlua,t', No. 2788
5. Nouvellcs ,\tlottrtlues. No. 2801
. 2 February lt)96.
. l0 Nlarch 1996
and Herzegovina by plor,'idin,e a form of niilitary
aid called " equip and train ". Twenty-nine coun-
tries. eleven of them Muslim. attended the cont-er-
ence but Europeans attcnded only as observers.
The Fifteen take the view that the process should
be one of " levelling dow'urvards " uot upwards"
u,hile the Arnericans want to be able to withdraw
their troops from Bosuia and Herzegoviuu
without being blamed, yet again. for abandoning
the Bosnian Muslims to their fate. They there-
fore rvant the Bosnians to have deterrent means,
trained army officers and properly-equipped
forces -.
25. The United States has therefore offbred to
provide 100 million of the 800 million dollars it
considers necessaly fbr an " aid and equipment
progralnme " for the Bosnian arnty'. How'ever at
the conf'ercnce the United States failed to obtain a
pledge for tlie sum ref'erred to. which it felt was
necessar), to rearm the troops of the Muslim-Croat
Federation in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Turkel,
alone promised to set aside 2 nrrllion dollars fbr
training Fc'deration officers. while the fifteen
E,uropean Union countries iustified their refusal to
participate in the " equip and traitr " progranrme-
rn the immediate future by emphasrsing the prior-
ity they intended to give to rebuilding the coun-
try". Hou'ever in General Hernrich's view, a sum
of around 200 million dollars may already be
available for the military programme.
26. The conteut of the " Common Position ou
the peace process in Yugoslavia " adopted by the
General Affairs Council of the European Union
on 26 February 1996. merely widencd the gult'
separating the European approach from that ofthe
United States. The Europeern Union in fact with-
dreu, its support lor the Vienna disarmament
negotiations bein,q conducted under Aunex I-B to
the Dayton and Paris Accords.
" With a vieu'to establishrng peace and sta-
bility for the people of the region of the fbr-
mer Yugoslavia. and in particular takrng
into account the need to ensure the saf'ety of
the international troops and civilian person-
nel deployed in Bosnia and Herzegt'rvina
and Croatia during the inrplementation of
the peace agreenrent. the European Union
believes that restraint on the part of anns
exporting countries will bc- needed even
after the UN arms embargo on the States ol
the forrner Yugoslavia is lifted in accor-
dance with UN Securitl' Council Resolu-
tion No. l02l . "
2'7. In its " Cornmon Position concerning arms
exports to the fbrmer Yugoslavia " also adopted
6. Le Fiqont, 16lt'larch 1996.
1 . Le filttrtdt'. l5 March I 996.
8. Nouvcllts Atlantiquc.r. No.
9. N ouv t' I I e : .4t krnti tptc s. N o.
2800. l6 N{arch 1996
280 I . l0 N'larch 1996
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on thls occasion, the European Union states that:
" during the period of the deployment of IFOR
and UNTAES'", as well as other operations inclu-
ding IPTF. the EU embargo on arms. munitions
and military equipment will be maintained
towards Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia and the
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia ".
28. In tackling this important subject dividing
Europeans and Americans, we need first of all to
ask ourselves to what extent the WEU Council
has been or is involved in the European decision-
making process. Was WEU invited to take part in
the Ankara conference? Did the European Union
consult WEU befbre reaching its common posi-
tion, referred to abol'e'l The issues of disarma-
ment. arms control and rearmament of Bosnia and
Herzegovina lie at the heart of WEU's area of
jurisdiction. both by virtue of its Treaty and of the
responsibilities assigned it by Title V of the Maas-
tricht Treaty.
29. The problcln remains on the table as the
Americans have said that they will pursue their
plan despite opposition from Europeans. The
issue is closely linked to other as yet unresolved
problems, in particular the way the situation in all
of the regions concerned cvolves, but above all.
whether or not it is possible to bring the necessary
political stability to a Republic of Bosnia and Her-
zegovina made up of two such widely differing
components.
30. The agreement on the creation of a United
Nations International Police Task Force (IPTF)
for monitoring, observing and rnspecting law
enforcernent in Bosnia and Herzegovina (Annex
I I to the framework agreement) was conceived as
a further stabilising factor in the situation. Thus
the United Nations Secuntl' Council decided in
Resolution 103-5 dated 19 December 1995. to
create 
- 
for a period of one year as reckoned from
the transf'er of UNPROFOR's responsibilities to
IFOR 
- 
a United Nations cir,'ilian police force,
charged with the tasks set out in Annex 1 I to the
peace a_qreement.
31. Recruitment of the I 721 police officers
envisaged by the United Nations has run into
some difficulty but. according to unofficial infor-
mation your Rapporteur obtained in Sarajevo at
the end of April 1996, approximately 700 police
officers had been dispatched to their postings.
Their task is cornplicated by the fact that as well
as having no executil'e powers and not carrylng
arrns. their success dc'pends on the goodwill and
cooperation of local police forces. The expericnce
of the WEU police detachment in Mostar illus-
trates that such goodwrll cannot alw'ay,s be relied
on.
10. United Nations Transrtional Adnrrnistratron tbr eastern
Slavonra. Baranja and western Sirnrrurn.
III. Problems liable to comprontise elforts
to establish a lasting peace in the Balkans
l. Peace, stability and the viability of the Republic
of Bosnia and HerTegovina
32. Many rssues remain which have not been
settled 
- 
or were only partially settled 
- 
by the
Dayton Accords, but finding solutions will be
decisive for the success of a new permanent order
of peace in the region concerned.
(u) Tlrc Brcko areu
3-3. The a-ereement on the demarcation line bet-
ween the components of the Republic of Bosnia
and Herzegovina did not settle the problem of the
Brcko area, an extremely narrow corridor running
between the eastern and western parts of the
Republika Srpska (the Serbian part of Bosnia and
Herzegovina) in the north of Bosnia and Herzego-
vina. The Bosnian Serbs. who seized control of
the corridor in 1992. wanted it to be widened; the
Muslims. however. objected on the grounds that
befbre the war the Brcko region was inhabited by
a Muslim-Croat majority.
3-1. In accordance with Article V of Annex 2 to
the Dayton framework agreement, the parties
concerned agreed to arbitration regarding the dis-
puted area. No later than six months after the
entry into force of the agreement, in other words
by June 1996. the Muslim-Croat Federation and
the Republika Srpska are each to appoint one arbi-
trator. A third arbitrator will be selected by agree-
ment of the parties within the following thrrty
days. If they do not agree. the third arbitrator will
be appointed by the President of the International
Court of Justice. The arbitrators are to give their
decision no later than one year from the entry into
force of the agreernent, in other words in late
1996. Although the parties are agreed that the
arbitrators' decision will be " final and binding "
it may be anticipated that the resulting arrange-
ment will be difficult to implement in view of the
strategic importance of the area in question to
both parties concerned. Most of those to whom
your Rapporteur spoke in Sarajevo confirmed fail-
ure to settle the question of the Brcko corridor
could becomc the trigger fbr a further war.
(b) The problem of Gora;de
35. Under the terms of the peace accords. the
Bosnians were required to cede the whole of east-
ern Bosnia and Herzegovina. a region where,
before the war. the Muslims made up the majority
of the population, to the Bosnian Serbs. The sole
exception is the towu of Gorazdc, which the Serbs
never lnanaged to take. The town of Gorazde is
therefore a Muslirn cnclave within the Republika
Sryska tcrritory. linked by a 5 krn wide corridor to
Muslr m-Croat Federat ion territory.
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36. According to the peace accords, " the Par-
ties understand and agree that a two-lane all-
weather road will be constructed in the Gorazde
Corridor " (to link the town with Sarajevo). It
was also agreed that " until such road construc-
tion is complete, the two interim roads will be
used by both entities ". One of these routes is a
narrow mountain road crossing the Mount Igman
range and accessible only to military all-purpose
vehicles. However the peace accords do not
include an obligation to build a more accessible
road during IFOR's mandate and the Bosnians
were satisfied with a verbal promise from the
United States to participate in this very difficult
task ". It is not known at present when the neces-
sary work will begin, who will pay for it and
when it is likely to be completed. IFOR currently
escorts three convoys a week across Serb
territory, but what will happen when IFOR pulls
out?
(c') Difficttlties of coexistence betw'een the
yarious components of the Republic of Bosnia and
Herzegovina
31. To guarantee the viability of the Republic
of Bosnia and Herzegovina, various problems still
have to be resolved regarding specrfic issues such
as the status of the town of Sarajevo and the admi-
nistration of Mostar, as well as the implementa-
tion of the Constitution of the Republic of Bosnia
and Herzegovina and the agreement establishing
the Muslim-Croat Federation in Bosnia and Her-
zegovina, the bases for which are still extremely
precanous.
(i) The status of Surajevo
38. According to the Constitution of Bosnia
and Herzegovina, drawn up in Annex 4 to the frame-
work peace agreement, the capital of Bosnia and
Herzegovina is Sarajevo. However major disputes
still have to be settled concerning the town's
administrative structure. But at the close of the
conference organised in Petersberg, near Bonn, in
late April, between representatives of the Muslim-
Croat Federation, an agreement seemed to emerge
in favour of a " three-tier " administrative struc-
ture for Sarajevo. According to this model. the
Sarajevo region, as a canton of Bosnia and Herze-
govina, would form part of the Federation. The
city would have its own district administration in
which the Croats would be involved. Sarajevo
would be at one and the same time the capital of
the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina and of
the Bosnian-Croat Federation. It remains to be
seen whether, despite their complexity, these
arrangements form a sound enough basis for a
viable administration.
(ii) The status and administration of the town
of Mostar
39. As far as the administration of the town of
Mostar goes, the difficulties which the German
administrator, Mr Koschnik encountered, will
also bear down upon his Spanish successor, Mr
Perez Casado. It should be recalled in this connec-
tion that the European Union mandate for the
administration of Mostar runs out on 23 July 1996
but the Muslim and Croat parties have already
asked for it to be extended until the end of 1996.
Indeed there is a very long way to go in applying
the Dayton Accords concerning the joint Muslim-
Croat status and administration of the town. Mos-
tar will perhaps be the acid test of the viability of
the Muslim-Croat Federation. Your Rapporteur
was able to obtain a clear idea of the problems
posed by reunification of the two parts of Mostar
when he visited the town on 13 April 1996 with
Sir Dudley Smith, President of the Assembly and
Mr de Puig, Chairman of the Political Committee.
40. On that occasion the ad hoc committee of
the Assembly was briefed on the situation by the
assistant European Union administrator and senior
officers of the WEU police force on the spot. In a
written report dated 7 March 1996, the outgoing
European Union administrator, Mr Koschnik, had
summarised the situation as follows:
" At the high-level meeting in Rome on 18
February, a new agreement on Mostar was
signed by PresidentZtbak and Vice-Presi-
dent Ganic. By this agreement the Croat
and the Bosnian sides finally agreed upon a
suggestion for the internal municipal boun-
daries of Mostar. I adopted this solution,
thus changing my decision on arbitration
because arbitration with six city municipa-
lities and a central zone would not have
been necessary at all if both sides had come
to an agreement earlier. A consensus
should always be preferred to arbitration in
this politically still over-sensitive region.
I was able to pursue this path even more
readily because both sides made a binding
declaration that their suggestion can only
be implemented if there is complete free-
dom of movement for all citizens in the
city, unification of local police units 
- 
with
the support of Croat and Bosnian non-
regional police officers 
- 
to form a ' unified
police force Mostar ' and an agreement on
the return of refugees to their old apart-
ments which at the moment are vacant or
will become vacant.
Now. all those measures were put into
effect on Tuesday, 20 February, at 14.00
hours. The interim statute of the city of
Mostar containing the boundaries for the
six city municipalities and the ' centralll. Le Morule, 10 April 1996
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zone' came into force together with the
clecree on nruuicipal electiorts (scheduled
for the end of May 1996).
So, we have a unified city with a difl-eren-
tial administrative organisation as agreed in
Dayton. We created indispensable precon-
ditions for participation of citizens in
making decisions concerning their city and.
on the basis of Dayton, put into force the
legal foundation for the realisation of
democratic elections.
Since I March we have a uniJted police on
duty in the 'blue zone ' of Mostar. that is.
in the area of the city for which the EU
Administration is responsible. In this res-
pect we received very valuable support
from the Republic of Croatia as well as from
the Bosnian police of central Bosnia. The
assistance of these police officers changed
the climate in Mostar for the better.
Freedom of movement for everybody in the
city has been in force since Tuesday, 20
February at 1.1.00 hours. Removal and
demolition of blockades and checkpoints
took longer than previously planned.
Nevertheless. it is now done. "
41. However, addressing the Parliamentary
Assembly of the Council of Europe '' on 25 April
1996, Mr Koschnik also stressed that implementa-
tion of the agreement had to be negotiated daily as
the Croat leadership of the town of Mostar did not
want reunification, still had visions of amalgama-
ting with Croatia and relied on heavily armed
gangs to lay down the law using strong-arm tac-
tics. Again according to Mr Koschnik. the same
was also true of the Muslims of central Bosnia
and Herzegovina and it was no easy matter to
break down the civil war mentality, even though
in certain areas nationalist passion was now run-
ning less high.
42. In Mostar. the European Union initially
asked WEU to assist the European administrator
in his task by dispatching a WEU police force,
whose main responsibility was to pave the way
for unification of the town's two separate police
forces. On 28 February 1996. the German
Government presented a report to the Bundestag
on WEU's activities for the period between I July
and 3l December 1995 ''. which summarised the
activities of the WEU police force as follows:
" Some 180 police officers have been sent
to Mostar, ... in the framework of the WEU
police detachment which is to provide sup-
12. Official Report of the l-lth srttrng. Thursday. 25 April
1996, AS (1996) CR 1.1; see also Recommendatron 1297
(1996) of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of
Europe.25 Apnl 1996.
I 3. Drucksachc. 13/3827.
port tor the European Union administration
of Mostar. Since summer 1995. Finland.
Austria and Sweden have also contributed
to this force. The planned reorganisation of
the two local police forces is proceeding
slowly and gradualll', largely because of
entrenched resistance on the Croat side. On
18 September 199-5 the parties signed an
agreement on moving to the second stage
of the process of bringing the two police
forces together. which provides specifically
for joint patrols consisting of Croat, Mus-
lim and WEU police officers and recruit-
ment and training of local police forces ".
43. Unlike the United Nations international
police fbrce. the WEU police force in Mostar is
lightly armed and has the right of legitimate self-
defence and certain coercive powers necessary to
enforce and maintain law and order. In spite of
this, it cannot be denied that the WEU police force
in Mostar was unable to protect the European
administrator when he was attacked. on 7
February last. by a crowd of demonstrators pro-
testing against his arbitration of how the cantons
of the municipality were to be divided. The pro-
tection affbrded by IFOR is necessary in extreme
situations such as these.
44. It seems hopeful that municipal elections in
Mostar, planned for the end of May. will contri-
bute to normalisation of the region, but it is pri-
marily on the revival of economic activity and the
creation of jobs that the population is pinning its
hopes for better living conditions afier the end of
hostilities.
(iii) Irrrplententettion of rhe Cortstilutiort of
B osni a urtd H e r:e gt tvi tr tr
45. For the Republic of Bosnia and Herzego-
vina as a whole to become a viable unit. internally
and externally, not only must its Constitution. the
text of which is set out in Annex 4 to the Frame-
work Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herze-
govina. be given effect, but equally the Agree-
ment on implementing the Federation of Bosnia
and Herzegovina of l0 November 199-5.
46. Under this latter agreement. it rs planned to
separate the responsibilities and the organisation
of the Government of the Federation (Muslim-
Croat) and the Government of the Republic of
Bosnia and Herzegovina in order to avoid any
conflict between areas of competence. It is impor-
tant to note that according to Articles II.5 and IL6
of this agreement the responsibilities of the Mus-
lim-Croat Federation include defertt'e, rnternal
affairs, justice, finance and also refugees and dis-
placed persons and social policy. However, the
Government of the Republic as a whole is respon-
sible for foreign polict', foreign trade, customs
policy, common monetary policy and civilion
c'oordination of the actitities of tlte orrued forces
l0
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in the whole territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina.
It is also agreed that the division of responsibrli-
tres described above " shall not diniinish the mili-
tary authority of the ARBiH (army of the Repub-
ilc of Bosnia and Herzegovina) or the HVO "
(Croat rnilitias).
41 . It is not difficult to imagine the dif1lculties
involved in such a system of divided responsibili-
ties which relates only to relations between the
Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the
Muslim-Croal Federation but does not govern
their institutional relations with the Serb area of
Bosnia and Herzegovina. namely the Republika
Srpska.
-18. These matters are dealt with in the Consti-
tution of Bosnra and Herzegovina, which stipu-
lates that Bosnia and Herzegovina consists of two
entities. the Federation of Bosnra and Herzego-
vina (Mr.rslim-Croat) and the Republika Srpska
(Serb part of Bosnia and Herzegovina). The
Constitution clearly states that firreign policy is
the responsibility of the institutions of Bosnia and
Herzegovina but is silent on the malter o1'defence
responsibilities. If, in the long term. defence
re mains the exclusive responsibility of each of the
two entities of the Republic of Bosnia and Herze-
govina. which were engaged in fighting one an-
other until IFOR put an end to hostilities. it is hard
to imagine that that state could once again become
a stable and homogenous entity.
49. Hower,'er there is no reason to give way to
pessimisnr while there is sti1l a possibility of cre-
ating the political will among the various factions
of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina to
help establish a stable and viable state. The gen-
eral elections that are planned for Septernber
could be a crucial factor in this respect. It is the
OSCE which has the main responsibility for the
extremely difticult task of ensuring. in coopera-
tion with the High Representative responsible for
coordinating the civilian aspects of the peace
agreement, that all the necessary conditions are
met to enable all the inhabitants and refugees to
vote in the elections. Holding genuinely tiee elec-
tions also implies doing away with intirnidating
and violent methods and ridding the country of
the political influence of those Bosnian Serb lead-
ers, such as Mr Karadzic and Mr Mladic, indicted
for war crimes. It rs thercfore essential to actively
support all the efforts berng made to hold the elec-
tions on schedule. In this connection it should be
stressed that the constructir,'e role some of the
country's religious authorities, notably the Cardi-
nal Archbishop of Sarajevo. have recently been
playing has done a great deal to help create the clim-
ate of trust that is indispensable.
50. Nevertheless, during his visit to Sarajevo
and Gorazde on 29 and 30 April 1996. your Rap-
porteur was able to gauge the extent to which the
views of the persons with whom he spoke differed
as legards their interpretation of thc Day'ton
Accords in relation to Bosnia and Herzegovina
and the conditions to be rnet fbr holding elections
and creating the political will necessary to rnake
the country viable.
5l . The High Representative responsible for
coordinating the civilian aspects of the peace
agreement. Mr Carl Bildt, inforrned youl Rappor-
teur that the parties conccrned werc interpreting
the civilian aspects of the Dayton Accords in two
diff-erent ways: some regarded them as a r.neans of
achieving a real separation between the entities of
Bosnia and Herzegovina in thc frantervork of a
conf-ederalion. while others saw them as working
towards the integratron of those same entities
within a federation. According to Mr Bildt, rt was
becouring increasingly clear that the Muslims and
Croats in the Bosnian Federation vr'ere rnoving in
dilTerent directions and neither group was pre-
pared to allow itself to be governed b1' others. In
particular the Croat-occupied parts of the Federa-
tion could be considered an extension of Croatia.
a tact confirmed b1' flags sirnilar to the national
flag of the State ol'Croatia being flown in a nurn-
ber of public places. Accordrng to Mr Bildt there
was still consrderable tension between the various
communities.
52. Settlement ol the difference over the Brcko
corridor will be crucial to maintaining pcace in
Bosnia and Herzegovina. The return of the refu-
gees, preparations fol the elections to be held in
September and securing aid to generate economic
recovery are the most irnportant tasks to be
accomplished and it will be necessary to ensure
that. as far as possible. all the civilian aspects of
the peace agreement are implemented while IFOR
troops are still in the countrv.
53. However on the subject of organisin-q gen-
eral elections in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Mr E,sad
Suljic, Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs of the
Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina. emphasised
to vour Rapporteur that the or,erriding condition
was the prior return to the country of the retu-{ces.
who would otheru'ise have no means of voting.
He therefore expressed soure reservations about
whether that condition u'ould be met by Septem-
ber. Moreover he ref'emed to economic aid as an-
other essential condition for norrnalising life
within the country. ln his view. it was nccessary
first to find jobs for the hundreds of thousands of
displaced persons.
54. According to the Deputy Mrnrster. the
European Union and the international community
should exert far stronger pressllre on the Croats to
persuade them to support the irnplementation of
the Muslim-Croat Federation. As far as the
chances of cooperating with the Serb part of the
Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina were
concerned, he rernained convinced that so krng as
Mr Karadzic and Mr Mladic continued to
l1
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influence Bosnian-Serb policy, there was no pros-
pect of cooperation. In point of fact, according to
press reports't, therc were divisions betw'een the
Serb leaders in Banja Luka and those in Pale over
which town should have the status of capital cit1,
of the " Serb Republic " ol'Bosnia. Although the
Banja Luka lc-aders seemed more moderate than
those of Pale. their airn was not to become invol-
ved in any rapprochement u,ith the Bosnian Mus-
lims or Croats. In their vicw. cooperation between
the two entities of Bosnia and Herzegovina should
be limited to rebuilding the country's infras-
tru cture.
-55. In an interview with Le Morde on 3 May
1996, Mr Rajko Kasagic. Prirne Minister of the
Serb Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, in-
voked the principle of reciprocitl, in the matter of
the return of refugees. " The Muslims insist on
returning to their villages but they u'ill not allow a
single Serb to enter their territory " he said.
According to Mr Kasagic. living sidc by side
would mean another war. As resards the airn of
bringin-e together all the Serbs of formcr Yugosla-
via in a single state, Mr Kasagic ansu,ered " we
cannot make that dream come true yet " and said
he was satisfred with the status of the Serb entity
created in Bosnia aud Herzegol'ina. He obserl'ed.
however, that he felt close to Mr Milosevic. As to
rvhether the war was over. he thought that when
people had found u,ork. they rr,'ould forget about
politics and allow their hatred to fade-.
56. During the conversation your Rapporteur
had u,'ith Geueral Heinrich. Deputy Coutrnander
of IFOR, the General ret-ened. intcr uliu, to the
difficulties involved in irnplementin-e the Federa-
tron of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The Bosnian
Serbs were reasonably satisfie'd with the Davton
Accords whrch recognised thern as an entity and
they still had in urind some sort of association
u'ith the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. The
Croats of Bosnia and Herze-qolina. on the other
hand. tended to place rnore crnphasis on econornic
matters.
5l . Mr Rasuiz Rijad. President of Gorazde Dis-
trict, raised the specil'ic problems of guarauteeing
fieedorn of rnovement between Gorazde and other
parts of Bosnia and Herzegt'n'iua. in the absence
of any indication to date as to when the ner.l' road
through the Sarajer o corridor rnight be built.
However. most of all. he emphasised the many
major ditficulties linked to the organisation of
general clections. owing to the largc nuntbers of
refugees. the abseuce of electoral registers. the
fact that many people had no identity documents
and so on. The outcome of thc- elections was entirc-
ly uncertain, but most to be f'eared, accttrding to
Mr Rasuiz Rijad. r,',as the fact that the Bosnian
Serbs might not accept the result of the ballot if it
11. Lt'lllrtrttlc..l Mu] l99rr.
did not suit them. The electorate would still want
to kuow what instruments were available to the
international commuuity to ensure observance of
the election results.
58. These are the urain impressions your Rap-
porteur gained fiom his visits to Mostar. Sara-jevo. Rogatica and Gorazde, which gave hinr
some idca of the wide range of problems arising
fronr the implementation of the peace accords
and the amount of work that still remains to be
done to consolidate peace and rebuild normality
in this w'ar-torn country. The situation requires
permanent negotiatious and man1, additional
arrangeurents have already been concluded to till
the manv gaps in the peace accord provisions.
The North Atlantic Council meeting in Berlin on
3 June I 996 and the revieu' conference on the
peace process. scheduled lor 13 and l4 June 1996
under European Union chairmanship. will be
rnajor forums for making an overall assessment
and taking decisions on the course to be fol-
lowed.
2. Problems outstanding betw,een Croatia
and the Federal Republic of lfugoslavia
59. In accordance with the Dayton Accords, the
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the Repub-
lic of Bosnia and Herzegovina have mutually
recognised one another as independent sovereign
states. Belgrade's recognition of the Former
Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM) in
April paved the way for recognrtion of the Federal
Rcpubhc of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro)
by the r-najority of European Union utember court;.
tries. lr,hile the United States is still waiting fbr
Belgrade to rnake a lirm commitntent to put an
end to repression of the Albanian population in
Kosovo before recognising the Federal Republic
of Yugoslavia in its turn.
60. To date there is no mutual recognition bet-
ween Belsrade and Zagreb, although the two
countries have established official contacts with a
vieu' to normalisin_9 relations and resolving rnat-
ters outstanding between thern.
(tt) Eo.ttenrSlavtttritt
61. Eastem Slal'onia. a border region close to
the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia is. together
q'ith the Baranja and western Srrmium regions.
the last Croat region still in the hands of break-
away Serbs, after having been the scene of some
of the bloodiest fighting during the war that fol-
loued Croatia's declaration of independence in
1991. It is planned gradualll, to reintesrate these
areas ir.rto the Republic of Croatia on the basis of
UN Security Council Resolution 1025 dated 30
Novernber 1995. which reaffirrns that the above-




62. In an agreement concluded on 12 November
1995 between the Croatian Government and the
local Serb authorities, it was agreed to demilitarise
the region and place eastern Slavonia under UN
international control and administration lor a tran-
sitional period of l2 months. The parlies requested
the Security Council to authorise deployment
during the transitional period of an international
force tasked with maintaining peace and security
and guaranteeing refugees and displaced persons
the possibility of returning to their homes. The
transitional administration was given the responsi-
bility, itier alia, of helping to set up and train tem-
porary police forces with a view to making them
more professional and building confidence bet-
ween the various ethnic communities.
63. A decision was therefore taken (UN Secu-
rity Council Resolution 1037 dated l5 January
1996) to end the mandate of UNCRO, which at
that time had sorne 1 600 to 1 700 " blue berets "
deployed on the territory of eastern Slavonia, and
to replace it, for an initial twelve-month period by
a United Nations transitional adrninistration for
eastern Slavonia, Baranja and western Sirmium
(UNTAES). The military component of UNTAES
will consist of a force of approximately 5 000
troops (instead of the 9 300 originally proposed
by the United Nations Secretary-General) and the
provisional administration, led by the retired
American General Jacques Klein.
64. The new operation will have NATO air sup-
port in the event of attack, and military backing
from IFOR. The specific tasks of the military
component of the administration are:
- 
to supervise demilitarisation of the
reglon;
- 
to supervise the return of refugees;
- 
to contribute to maintaining peace in the
region.
The civilian component should inter ulia make a
contribution to: establishing a temporary police
force, human rights enforcement, reconstruction
of the region and organising elections no later
than thirty days prior to the end of the transitional
period.
65. The United Nations force in eastern Slavo-
nia has been placed under the command of the
Belgian General Joseph Schoups with demilitari-
sation of eastern Slavonia scheduled to start in
May. The Belgian General took up his duties on
14 March 1996 and dernilitarisation began with a
wholesale withdrawal of anti-aircraft missiles and
60o/c of the tanks in the region. The UNTAES
force could be declared operational around l5
May and deniilitarisation could begin officially
within a period of thirty days's.
66. However General Schoups had previously
w'arned the Belgian Government that if financial
resources, additional firrces and police officers
were not dispatched more quickly, the United
Nations risked further failure and it would prob-
ably be the last time it mounted an operation of
this nature'n. ln order to stabilise the situation in
the region and reassure the UN troops that rts sup-
port would be forthcoming, IFOR has opened a
communication line which is to link Hungary and
Bosnia and Herzegovina via eastern Slavonia.
The military component of UNTAES will be
made up of Argentine. Belgian. Czech, Jordanian,
Pakistani, Russian, Slovak and Ukrainian units.
61 . Reference was made, in a debate which took
place in the Belgian Senate on 8 FebruiLry 1996, to
the range of risks involved in implementing this
new peace operation, under NAIO auspices, in the
Balkans, when a member of the Senate pointed out
that if it proved impossible to obtain significant
results, particularly in terms of demilitarisation and
the return of refugees. at an early stage. it would be
necessary to withdraw UN forces immediately
because otherwise their presence would, once
again, give the (Serb) aggressor an advantage. and
constitute a final endorsernent of Serb army
conquests. Moreover he f'elt that if demilitarisation
did not make headway and the refugees did not
return home. Croatia would have the right to inter-
vene militarily to recover the territory.
68. Belgium's Minister for National Defence,
Mr Poncelet. observed on this occasion that:
" ln the event of a Croat attack. the use of
force to prevent such action will not be
envisaged. The military component. de-
signed to act in the framework of an agree-
ment between the parties and heuce of
voluntary demilitarisation. does not have
adequate means to resist a large-scale
attack from either the Serb or Croat side.
It is true that the United Nations Secretary-
General had initially ... estimated UNTAES
as a lorce of some 9 300 men. However ...
this estimate was dependent on the entire
rnission being executed within the frame-
work of Article VII of the United Nations
Charter and hence envisaged enforced
demilitarisation against the will of one or
other of the parties. which is not the case
with the mandate which is to be applied.
Other than the threat to which I have just
ref'erred. this UN force rvould. if necessary,
have to repel any external attack mounted
either by Zagreb or Belgrade. Our approach
was ditferent ... and was founded on the
principle that UN action should be based on
15. Nouvellcs Atluntique:;. No. 2811, 26 April 1996
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agreement between the parties. However
we should have no illusions: past evcnts in
tormer Yusoslavia have shown us that this
a_greernent often exists nrore on paper than
in practice. This was why we agrec-d that
Article VII should be applied fbr the sake
of the security and lieedom of rnovernent
of our troops. Armcd meaus can therefore
be used to this end. "
69. It rnust thercfore be recognised that the
basis of this new mandate. narnely an agreement
betweeu the Croatian Government and the region-
al Serb authorities 
- 
not the Belgrade Govern-
ment 
- 
is sclltrerr''hat prccarious. The new fblce
will adrnittedly be better anned and able to def'end
itself than the fbrmer UNCRO, but it cannot nrake
demilitarisation etfectiye nor. should the case
arise. prevent a resulnption of hostilitics. There-
tore it can only be hoped that implementation of
the agreernent between Croats and Serbs on east-
crn Slavonia u'ill take place u,ithout difficulty.
Given. however, that in the event of dit1iculties.
there is a risk of a repetition of the UN/NATO
" dual-keys problem " in eastern Slavonia. one
might u'onder u,hy it was uot possible for the
peace settlement for this region to be included
rvithin the general framework of the Dayton
Accords.
70. Bearing in rnind thc fairly modest scale ol'
the operation in eastern Slavonia as cornparcd
rvith that of IFOR in Bosnia and Herzegovina.
other solutions could eve-n have been envisaged.
fbr exarnple that of a European force actiug under
a UN mandate under the political control of WEU.
As to help in setting up and tlaining a police tbrce
in the region. consideration nrght also have bcen
given to invitin-s WEU to assist on the basis of its
experiences in Mostar. Howel'er it does not seem
that such matters were even discusscd in the
Councrl of WEU.
(b) Tlrc Preyluku putittsulct
I l. Another obstacle to mutual reco_{nition of
Zagreb and Belgrade is the Prevlaka peninsula.
situated at the entry to Kotor Bay in the Adriatic.
possession of rvhich is clairned by Bclgrade. Ajoint declaration signed in Geneva on 
-30 $gp1sm-
ber 1992 between the Republic of Croatia and
Fedcral Republic of Yugoslavia reaffirms the
agreement of both countries to demilitarisation of
the peninsula. but there has been no resolution of
the underlying dispute to date.
12. In Resolutit'rn 1038 dated l-5 January 1996.
the Securitv Council authorised the UN rnilitary'
observers tasked with verifying demilitarisation
of Prevlaka to continue their work. while stressing
thc need for Croatia and the Federal Republic of
Yu_eoslavia to coure to an agrcement for the peace-
firl resolution of their ditferences over the penin-
sula. The Resolution provides for tu'o options:
namely extension of the mandate or tasking ano-
ther iuternational orcanisation with verifying
demilitarisation. Furthennore, the Untted Nations
Secretary-General is asked to report on progress
made by the two countries involved torvards a
peaceful settlement of the dispute. which is one of
the most irnportant factors for re-establishing
peace in the Balkans.
3. Probletns in the pntvirtces of Kosovo,
Vttj t' o di n a a n d Sa n dj ak
73. Reconrrnendation 
-581 on the situation in
former Yugoslavia. based on the report submitted
to the Assembll' by Mr Fassino in June 199-5''.
specifically requested the WEU Council to " call
on the Govemurent in Belgrade to restore autono-
mous structures to Kosovo and Vojvodina and
reviell' its arrangernents for minorities in the
Sandjak and elscwhere ". In its reply' to the
Recommendation. the Council made no comntent
on these particular aspects.
11. This silence is the more regrettable in view
of the deterioration in the situation. particularly in
Kosor,o. since late April 1996. Several armed
confrontations which caused scven deaths in a
single u'eek havc occured. with Albanians fight-
ing both Serb law-enforcement oflicers and Serb
civilians ''. After the sigrraturc of the Dayton
Accords, it would seem that the Kosovo Alba-
nians feel thev can no longer count on support
fronr the West. There is therefore a possibility that
the policy' of p:lssive resistance advocated b1, the
Kosovo Democratic League rnight bc replaced by
a more offensive strategy.
15. Washington has rnade settlement of the
Kosovo question one of its priorities since the
signature of the Davton Accords on Bosnia and
Herzegovina. Thus Mr Christopher receutlv pres-
se-d Mr Milosevic about the adoption of a statute
guaranteeing thc rights of the population of
Kosovo. Ho'nr,'ever now that Belgrade has been
recoguised by thc European Llnion countries, the
Go,''ernment of the Federal Republic of Yugosla-
via seerns confident that no-one u'ill be prepared
to make a comnitment to autononty lor Kosovo 
"'.
The situation uorries the leadership not only in
Albania but also in the Fornrer Yugoslal'Republic
of Macedonia (FYROM). Mr Carl Bildt. the High
Representative responsible for coordinating the
civilian aspects of the Dayton Accords. stressed
early in May 1996 that it was important to find a
solution acceptable both to Belgrade and to the
Kosovo Albanians and that a fbrm of autonontv
u'ould be necessary for the regionr". Furthermore
17. Docurnent l+67. ll June 1995.
18. Le llortde.3 May 1996.
19 Le llrutle. 3 1\{ai l 996
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the NATO Secretary-General. Mr Solana, felt that
the return to Kosovo of the OSCE mission, expel-
led in July 1993 after condemning growing
repression b1' the Serb authorities against the
ethnic Albanian population. was nccessary.
16. The Presidc-nt of the Fortner Yugoslav
Republic of Macedonia (FYROM), Mr Gligorov.
also said he was very concerncd by developments
in Kosovo and felt that any escalation might evcn
lead to another major u,ar in the Balkans. He there-
fore asked for the opening of direct negotiations
between Albanians of the province and the
Governrnent in Belgrade-rr. However it is high
time for an evaluation of the situation by the
appropriate international authorities which have
undertaken to restore and rnaintain peace on the
terrrtor), of fbrmer Yugoslavia.
IV What are the strategic options for guaranteeiltg
lasting peace, stability and security
in the Balkons after the end of hostilities?
11 . Several questions alise: agreeurent must
lirst be reached on those problerns for which a
solution is considered a rnatter of priority as far as
the large majority of those responsible are con-
cerned. Adrnittedly, objections might be made to
such an approach on the grounds that all the prob-
lems are interrelated and therefore of equal impor-
tance. However your Rapporteur is convinced that
the key issue on rvhich peace in the Balkans
depends is whether the Republic of Bosnia and
Herzegovina can be madc viable and how long it
u'ill take.
18. The leaders of the various entities of the
Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the
authorities of the international comrnunity res-
ponsible tor itnplementing the civilian aspects of
the Dayton Accords appear to agree on one point,
namely that one of the nrost intportant ways of
reconciling opposin-t factions and pacifying the
country is to rekindle hope among its various
comnrunities that peaceful coexistence u'ill bring
thenr definite prospects ol' an intprovemetrt in
their economic and social situation and their
llving conditions. There is thereforc- general
agreement that the econoury must be revived
quickly and jobs created.
19. However. to achieve this. it is necessary to
ensure that econornic and financial aid is not frit-
tered away in the process and that part of it does
not fall into the hands of Mafia groups, which ale
making substantial efforts to turn the despet'ate
plight in which most regions of the country find
themselves to theil own advantage. But it is
equally necessar)' for an effectil'e strategy to be
put in place in order to convince the recipients of




assistance might be awarded only to those dis-
tricts allowing refu-eees and displaced persons to
return unhindered to their homes. Economic aid
could also be made conditional upon production
by the respective aLrthorities of the entities of Bos-
nia and Herzegovina of concrete proof that thel'
were working actively tou'ards cornpliance with
the fundamental principles on which both the
existencc' of the Muslim-Croat Federation and the
l,iability of the Bosnian slate as a whole dcpend.
80. Pointers in this direction are to be found in
the agreernent concluded in Saraf evo on 30 March
1996 between the representatives of the Muslint-
Croat Federation and of the Republic of Bosnia
and Herzegovina and the Assistant to the High
Representative responsible fbr coordinating the
civilian aspects o1'the peace agreement. but tor
the most part the)' concern rnatters internal to the
Federation.
81. As far as rcvival of the economy of the
town of Gorazde is concerned. it is absolutely
essential for a start to be made without delay on
constructing a two-lane, all-weather road along
the corridor linking Corazde with the other parts
of the Muslirn-Cnrat Federation. as provided by
the Agreement on the Military Aspects of the
Peace Settlement. Your Rapporteur. who had the
opportunitv of travclling along one of the interirn
routes to Gorazde. with the assistance of the Por-
tlrguese battalion deployed at Rogatica. north of
Gorazde. reached the conclusion that a resump-
tion of economic activity in the town is wholll'
unthinkable without a road-link other than the two
intcrim routes. Even if construction of thc- neu'
road began immedrately 
- 
assuming that the mat-
ter of finance and the proble-rn of mine clearance
were solved 
- 
it rvould take solne tirne to cotn-
plete the work.
82. Your Rapporteur is conviuced that if Bos-
nia and Herzegovina is to be made viable. it is
also absolutelv essential to create the necessary
conditions tor organising general elections in the
countrv. since thcse are esseutial fbr the intple-
mentation of its Constitution. which for the time
being cxists onl1, on paper. To this end, the inter-
national community, but also the populations
which have a profound desire to see a lasting
peace c-stablislied rn the country as a whole, will
have to keep up pressure on the political leaders
of the entitres in Bosnia and Herzegovina. the
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and Croatia to
ensure that all of them undertake to implenrent the
peace accords. It is obvious that elections lvill
only be useful if the cntire population 
- 
rncluding
rellgees and drsplaced persons 
- 
is able to vote.
83. Elections are in fact essential if it is hoped
to make ccrtaitt adjustments and atnendments to21 . F rur*-fitrtcr AlLagerrrcitrc Zertuu,q.2 N'Iai 1996.
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the Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina and
in the provisions of the Dayton Accords on imple-
menting the Federation of Bosnia and Herzego-
vina specifically concerned with apportioning
defence responsibilities within the Republic of
Bosnia and Herzegovina. At present thcre are
three different armed forces in the country: the
Croatian militias and the Muslim forces, which
are to merge within the tiamew'ork of the Muslim-
Croat Federation. and the Bosnian Serb forces. On
1.1 May 1996. the leaders of the Muslim-Croat
Federation in Bosnia and Herzegovina agreed in
Washington to unify their forces within three
years rr.
8,1. However, neither the Constitution as adop-
ted at Dayton nor the agreement on implementing
the Muslim-Croat Federation in Bosnia and Her-
zegor,'ina makes provision for the Central Govern-
ment of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina
to have responsibilities rn defence ntatters. It
seems that Dayton took as its point of departure
the idea that defence responsibilities should
remain with thc- two entities of the Republic,
which implied the existence of two different
armies 
- 
in fact there are three at present 
- 
opera-
ting side by side within the country.
85. Your Rapporteur is convinced that such a
solution can only be regarded as temporary and it
will be necessary in the longer term 
- 
despite the
enormous difficulties that would have to be over-
come to achieve it 
- 
to envisage creating a united
army fbr the entire country. under a singJe defence
minister within the Government of the Republic
of Bosnia and Herzegol'ina. The allocation of res-
ponsibility for internal aftairs raises a similar prob-
lem on account of the fact that two (or three) dif-
ferent police fbrces coexist within the country, but
this problem is less worrying than the issue of
whether the will exists to unite the armed forces
and whether or not it can be done.
86. The agreement on confidence- and secur-
ity-building measures signed in Vienna on 31
January by the entities of Bosnia and Herzegovina
and the OSCE might constitute the point of depar-
ture fbr a process leadrng in the long term to the
creation of a united army for Bosnia and Herzego-
vina. This agreement provides. inter olia, for mili-
tary cooperation and joint training and exercises
fbr the armies of the entities of Bosnia and Herze-
govina. and for exchanges of specialists. the org-
anisation of seminars on military cooperation and
infbrmation exchanges on the agreements, mili-
tary contacts and cooperation with other parties.
On the basis of this incipient cooperation, it will
therefore be necessary to work towards progres-
sive rapprochement oi the armed forces in Bosnia
and Herzegovina. with the long-term aim of unifi-
cation.
87. In the context of such a policy, the " equip
and train " programme introduced by the Ameri-
cans for the Bosnian forces, must be rethought
and reconciled with the negotiations on disarma-
ment in Bosnia and Herzegovina, which are
taking place in Vienna under the auspices of the
OSCE. According to information that has appear-
ed in the press". these negotiations are progres-
sing satisfactorily and stand a good chance of
ending as scheduled by 6 June 1996. The whole
policy directed towards implementation of the
agreements on regional stabilisation reached at
Dayton must not be jeopardised by the expiry of
IFOR's mandate in Bosnia and Herzegovina pro-
vided for in those agreements.
88. According to Pentagon representatives, it
would be unwise to deal too early with the ques-
tion of extending IFOR's mandate, given the
need to keep up pressure on the parties and urge
them to implement all the provisions of the agree-
ments while the IFOR troops are still in Bosnia
and Herzegovina. However it is clear, even now.
that implenrentation of the civilian aspects of the
agreements will take tar longer than a year. Hos-
tility, distrust and tension between the various
communities are still so acute that they will
disappear only with time. The question at issue is
whether such developments u,ill be possible
without an IFOR or other reduced torm of mili-
tary presence.
89. According to information which has appear-
ed in the pressrt, the Pentagon now seents pre-
pared to extend the stay of at least some of the
American troops to one month beyond the 20
December 1996 deadline. Some of the people
your Rapporteur spoke to on 29 April in Sarajevo
considered that it would be necessary to maintain
a smaller force in Bosnia and Herzegovina after
that date. The size of the force could be reduced
on the basis of a number of options but, in the opin-
ion of some experts, the following conditions
would have to be met:
(a) a credible organisation should be made
responsible for management of this
smaller force. In the light of the exper-
ience of IFOR, which has won the res-
pect of all sections of the population.
NATO alone could take on this new
task;
(b) the smaller force should be gtven a
very clear mandate;
(c) an American troop presence, even if
only symbolic. on Bosnian soil would
be absolutely essential for without a
presence. albeit symbolic, such a force
would have no credibility.
23 FrartLlitrter tlllgenteirte Zcrttutg,30 April 1996.
24 For eramplc in the Neuc 7.urt'her Zeitr.urg. 27 Apnl 1996
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22 Le Mortde.l6 May 1996.
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90. These observations would appear to be in
line with information to the effect that neither the
WEU Presidency nor the Secretariat-General are
considering the possibility of entrusting the com-
mand of a post-IFOR force to WEU. Even cooper-
ation on a smaller scale than that organised
through IFOR would not be possible for WEU rs.
Moreover, Mr Cutileiro. Secretary-General of
WEU. said on 2 May 1996'" that WEU would not
replace IFOR at the head of a peace fbrce in Bos-
nia and Herzegovina if the United States decided
to withdrarn, its lbrces ahead of those of its Euro-
pean allies. Although WEU was the only Euro-
pean organisation with responsibility in defence
matters, it was still not equipped to take on a task
of that magnitude.
91. Your Rapporteur tends to take the view that
the basic problem is more oI a psychological
nature than one of WEU's actual capability: rt
concerns the credibility of an all-European fbrce
led by an organisation which is virtualll, un-
known. The situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina
is in fact too sensitive to be used as a testing-
ground for WEU's capabilities. This does not.
however. mean that WEU must be excluded fl'om
the peace process in the Balkans. Your Rapporteur
will deal in greater depth with some ide:ls on the
subject in the fbllowing chapter.
V Conclusions os regards the course
to be followed and WEU's future role
in the peace process in the Balkans
92. The ministerial meeting of the WEU Coun-
cil held in Birmingham on 7 May 1996, thc meet-
ing of the North Atlantic Council to be held in
Berlin on 3 June and the review conf'erence on the
peace process in the Balkans. to be held in Rorne
on 13 and 1-l June. are all opportunities for eval-
uating progress to date aud drawing up an agreed
pro-qrarnme of work for the organisations and
states involved in order to completc the many
tasks remaining to be accomplished to achieve a
lasting peace in former Yugoslavia.
93. More specilically with regard to WEU's
role in this context. the WEU Council should
make an approach to the European Union request-
ing the latter to extend the mandate of the Euro-
pean administration of Mostar 
- 
on which exten-
sion of the rnandate of the WEU police torce rn
Mostar also depends 
- 
bey'ond the 23 July 1996
timeframe. As Sir Dudley Smith, President of thc
WEU Assembly. stressed in a letter dated l9 April
1996 to the British Chairmanship-in-Ofticc of the
Council, the WEU police force in Mostar has
already made encouraging progress towards re-
unification of local police forces but its task is
25. The Independettt. 
-l Ma1 1996.
26 Agertca Froucc-Presse, 2 May 1996.
nowhere ncar completed. Moreover', WEU's
experience in Mostar might possibly encourage
the Councrl to offbr WEU police assistance in
other contcxts where such help might prove
necessary.
94. As regards WEU's future duties in relation
to monitoring the ernbargo on the Danuhe and in
the Adriatic. these will largell,depend on the out-
come of the nc-qotiations on disanranrent in Bos-
nia and Herzegovina which are currently taking
place in Vienna under OSCE auspices and which
are due to end by 6 June 1996. It should be recal-
led in this context that the United Nations Secu-
rity Council decided in Resolution 1021. adopted
on 22 November 1995. that the embalgo imposed
on arms und military equipmcnl con:icnments in
Resolution 113 (1991) u,ould end under certain
conditions. These include the lbllowing: once the
Secretary-General suburits a report by 12 June
1996 on the implernentation of Annex l-B (rcgio-
nal stabilisation. agreernent on disarmament) as
agrccd by the parties. all provisions of the
embargo ou armarnents will cease to apply, unless
the Security Council decides otheru'ise. Simrlar
provisions were agreed rn Resolution 1022 with
re-eard to the litiing of sanctions irnposed on the
Bosnian Serbs.
95. The srtuation thus created provides the
opportunity for an assessmc'nt of the re'sults of
operations carried out b1, WEU in relation to
monitoring and enforcing the embargo on the
Danube and in the Adriatic. The German Govern-
nrent's report on the activities of WEU for the per-
iod between 1 July and 3l Deceniber 1995. sub-
mrtted to the Bundestag on 28 February 1996,
surnrnarises these operations as follows:
" Police and customs officers of the WEU
member states continue successfully to
assist the riparian states of the Danube
- 
Bulgaria. Hungan, and Romania 
- 
in
monrtoring and controlling enfbrcement of
the arms ernbargo the United Nittions deci-
ded to irnpose on Serbia and Montenegro,
and the trade embargo on fbrmer Yugosla-
via. Since thc start of the operation in Juue
1993, more than 6 300 shipping convoys
have been monitored. Controls rc-lating to
the application of econornic sanctions
imposed on Serbia and Montenegro were
ternporarily suspended as from 23 Novem-
ber 1995 in pursuance of United Nations
Security Council Resolutions 1021 and
1022 ( 199-s).
The implementation of sanctions imposed
b1, the United Nations in the fiamervork of
Operation Sharp Guard. conducted jointly
bv NATO and WEU rn the Adriatic. has
been adapted. in accordance with Security
Council Re solutions 102 I and 1022 ( 1995).
Between the time the embargo in the Adria-
t1
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tic uas enlbrced on 22 Novembcr 1992 and
22 Noveurher 199-5. over 6-1 100 ships were
identified and/or questioned. Of these. over
-l 900 were inspected and I 200 werc ins-
tructed to sail to Italian ports for further
investigation. "
96. It should be noted in this counection that
notwithstanding Resolution 1021. the European
Union decided late in February 1996 to uraintain
the embargo on amrs. arnmunition and milrtary'
equipnrent bound for Bosnia and Herzegovina,
Croatia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.
tor as long as IFOR, UNTAES and the United
Nations International Policc' Task Force (IPTF)
were deploycd.
91 . Moreover. the Americans have launched
their " equip and train " prograrrrne: this is inten-
ded erclusively fbr the Bosnian army. r.l'hich not
onl1' risks running into conflict with European
policy as descnbed above but also counteracts
effbrts to establish regional stability in Bosnia and
Herze-eovina based on confidence-building and
disarrnament measures as set out in Annex l-B to
the Dayton Accords.
98. WEU, which has links both rvith the Euro-
pean Union and the Atlantic Alliance and all of
whose mcmber couutries are also members of the
OSCE, is very well placed to launch a political
initiative u'ithin NATO to harmouise European
and Arnerican thinking and avoid political differ-
euces betwecn Americans and Europeans over
Bosnia and Herzegovina becoming even morc
pronounced. In this connection. it should be borne
in rnind that the question of whether or not to
maintain the embar-eo is more the province of the
United Natrons. as Securitl' Council Resolutions
102 I and 1022 set specific criteria under w'hich it
might be lifted.
99. One of the key questions in bringing the
European and Anrerican positions closer together
is how the Bosnian Serb entity. the Republika
Srpska. should be treated in future. Following the
crisis summit in Rome on l6 nd lJ February
1996. it was decided to lift economic sanctions
imposed on the Bosnian Serbs: however. for as
loug as they continue to refuse to allow Mr Karad-
zic and Mr Mladic to be brought betbre the Inter-
national War Crimes Tribunal in The Hague. it will
be ditficult to cooperate u'ith the Serb entity of
Bosnia and Herzegovina. The utmost thcrefore
nceds to be done to consolidate the rnoderate poli-
tical torces in Banja Luka. as the ultimate goal
must bc to involve the Serb faction in all schemes
to re-establish conditions allowing the whole
Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina to tlnction
properly 
- 
this also applies to security and defence
matters especialh,as the agreement on confidence-
building measures providcs. inter oliu. fbr joint
exercises between the armies of the dift'erent enti-
ties rnaking Lrp Bosnia and Herzegovina.
100. It would therefore be preferable to delay the
American project until the disarrnament agreement
has been concluded 
- 
which is expected to be in
June 
- 
and substantial progress has been achieved
in terms of confidence-building measures. In addi-
tion. contact will have to be made with the Russian
Government to persuade it to delay its plan to lift
the embargo on arms bound fbr successor countries
of former Yugoslavia until such time as the nego-
tiations on disarmament and the confidence-
building measures have yielded positive results.
101. WEU urember couutries will have an
opportunity at the North Atlantic Council meetrng
in Berlin. on 3 June 1996. to take a joint initiative
to that effect. In another area, that of the CJTF, an
agreement scems imminent and will probably be
presented to the public at that same North Atlantic
Council meeting. Mr Solana. the NATO Secre-
tary-General. said in an article which appeared in
the March 1996 issue of the NAIO Relic,u'. under
the title " NATO's Role in Bosnia: charting a new
course for the Alliance " that in many ways the
CJTF concept was having a trial run in Bosnia and
Herzegovina. " driven ... by the requirements of
assembling the IFOR from Alliance and non-
Alliance troop and asset contributions ".
102. He also u'ent on to say: " we will also need
to develop the CJTF concept to serve as a means
by which a WEU (or European)-led operation
could nrake use of Alliance assets. il'it were to be
decided that a WEU (or European) rather than a
full NATO response was warranted in a future
contingency ". Even if replacement of IFOR by a
European WEU-led force is not euvisaged, peace
enforcement in the Balkans is a problem that will
continue to be a heavy burden tbr the security of
the European countries especially after the expiry'
of the IFOR urandate. WEU. as the only European
organisation with re'sponsibility tor security and
defence matters, is therefore very well placed to
present NATO w'ith proposals. based on an agree-
ment on CJTF, which would (a) set out to estab-
lish the conditions and scope for any deplol'ment
in the territory of fbrmer Yugoslavia of a small
intclnational force in which the United States
u'ould participatc with ground troops fbllowing
the expiry of the IFOR and UNTAES mandates
and (b) rnake provision for the possibility of
NATO and WEU sharing rcsponsibilities for
controllrng the operations envisaged. Such res-
ponsibilities shared in accordance with the CJTF
concept could. fbr example, be exercised in east-
ern Slavonia if the situation so required. More-
or er. WEU should examine the possibility of pro-
posing to the United Nations that rnilitary
observcrs be sent to monitor demilitansation of
the Prer'laka peninsula. in accordance with Reso-
lution 1038 of the Securitv Council.
103. The WEU meurber countries should also
seize the opportunity offered by the ureeting of
t8
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the North Atlantic Council to ask for an evalua-
tion of the results of the conference on security in
the southern Balkans, held in Tirana, at Albania's
initiative. on I and 2 April 1996, and attended by
the defence ministers of Albania, Bulgaria, Italy,
Macedonia, Turkey and the United States, and
representatives of the OSCE. Greece had refused
to take part. taking the view that all the other Bal-
kan countries, such as Romania and the successor
countries of former Yugoslavia. should have been
invitedr". It is important to have an assessment of
the aim and usefulness of a regional initiative
such as this in order to be able to study, as neces-
sary, the prospects for pursuing such projects
under the auspices of a European organisation, for
example WEU.
104. Finally, in the context of the conference to
review the peace process in the Balkans scheduled
to take place in Rome on 13 and 14 June 1996,
WEU should place the emphasis on follow-up
action to the initiative taken by the European
Union at Royaumont for setting in train a process
promoting stability and good-neighbourly rela-
tions in south-eastern Europe along the lines of
the Pact on Stability in Europe, and proposing that
in due course it take the form of a regional round
table for strengthening stability, good-neigh-
bourly relations and cooperation in south-eastern
Europe, at which all the states in the region would
be represented. It should furthermore insist on
being invrted as an observer to the " identification
meeting " announced in the declaration of the
General Affairs Council of the European Union
on 26 and 27 February 1996.
VI. Conclusions
105. Six months after the signature of the Day-
ton and Paris Accords which put an end to hostili-
ties in Bosnia and Herzegovina, it is still too soon
to be able to state with certainty that a lasting
order of peace and security can be established on
the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina and in
eastern Slavonia. Although it has been possible to
implement the military aspects of the accords
relatively quickly and without insurmountable
difficulty, practical implementation of the civilian
aspects continues to raise many problems.
106. There are many encouraging signs to sug-
gest that it will be possible to overcome these
various problems. but there are also major uncer-
tainties, especially as regards the need to fire the
Croat, Bosnian and Serb entities and communities
with the political will to coexist peaceably once
again in their war-torn country and thus lay the
foundations that are essential to make it a viable
and stable country. In this connection, how the
situation develops will largely depend on what
can be achieved, particularly on the basis of gen-
eral elections, in terms of replacing arrangements
which have been imposed on parties that are hos-
tile to one another by a spirit of cooperation,
accompanied by a desire on the part of those
involved to see public affairs taken in hand by the
authorities of the country.
101 . All the international organisations involved
in this process are duty-bound to help develop this
frame of mind so that the country can be rebuilt on
the basis of the free will of its people. without
which military protection and economic aid can-
not serve any real purpose.
108. Moreover it should not be forgotten that the
Balkan region as a whole belongs to Europe; it is
therefore primarily the responsibility of the Eulo-
pean institutions to help turn this part of Europe
into a region as prosperous as the other European
countries. Although Europe needed United States
aid to bring an end to the war, it now has the
opportunity, and a duty, to make an important
contribution to restoring peace.
109. What must be avoided at all costs is this
difficult task becoming a bone of contention bet-
ween Americans, Europeans, Russians and Mus-
lim countries. This is a test case not only for devel-
oping a proper CFSP but also for a joint
transatlantic policy. WEU, though its close rela-
tions with the European Union and the Atlantic
Alliance, has a particular responsibility in this
connection. lt has made important contributions
to the management of the conflict in the Balkans,
within the limits of the remits assrgned to it. In
future, it should be less modest and more prodigal
in offering its capabilities and good offices for the
advancement of the peace process and the preven-
tion of any resumption of hostilities.
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Your Rapporteur wishes to convey his most sincere thanks to the authorities that provided him with
help and assistance in the preparation of this report. He wishes to express his gratitude to the Permanent
Representative of Portugal to WEU. Ambassador Antonio Martins da Cruz. and especially to the Head of
Portugal's Mission to Sarajevo, Ambassador Antonio Tanger Correa. for his invaluable contribution in
organising talks in Sarajevo and Gorazde, the Commander of the Portuguese battalion at Rogatica, Col-
onel Mogo Ferreira, and the other Portuguese officers and military personnel accompanying him.
The visit programme was as follows:
l3 April 1996
Visit to Mostar. accompanied by Sir Dudley Smith. President of the Assembly of WEU, and Mr de
Puig, Chairman of the Political Committee
talks with:
- 
Ambassador Klaus Metscher. (former) Acting European Administrator for Mostar
- 
Sir Martin Garrod. Chief-of-Staff, European Union Administration of Mostar
- 
Colonel Pieter Lambrechtse, WEU Police Commissioner
- 
Colonel Heinrich Parusel, WEU Deputy Police Commissioner
- 
Mr Pedro Azevedo, WEU Assistant Liaison Officer
- 





Mr Carl Bildt, High Representative responsible for coordinating the civilian aspects of the peace
agreement for the former Yugoslavia
- 
Mr Esad Suljic, Deputy Minisler for Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina
- 
General Heinrich, Deputy IFOR Commander
30 April 1996
Rogaticct: talks with the Commander of the Portuguese Battalion
Gorozde: talks with the President of the Canton of Gorazde, Mr Rascic Rijad
meeting with humanitarian organisations at the office of the United Nations High Com-
missioner for Refugees.
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